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INTRODUCTION
Mathematical ability, like spatial and verbal
abilities, is an area in which fairly consistent sex
differences have been found. Males out-perform females
at tasks measuring mathematial and spatial abilities,
while females out-perform males at tasks measuring
verbal abilities (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).
Yet, it is not clear whether these differences are
innate, or learned, or a combination of both. The
purpose of this paper is to further explore one area of
learned differences between the sexes, Attribution
Theory of Achievement Motivation, that may explain the
small yet significant difference (Fennema & Sherman,
1977; Hyde, 1981; Ridley & Novak, 1983) between males'
and females' performance in one cognitive ability
category, mathematics.
Quite a volume of research has looked for a
biological basis for sex differences in cognitive
abilities. Researchers have probed brain lateralization
(Levy, 1981; Sherman, 1977), an X chromosome linked gene
(Stafford, 1972) and hormonal differences (Money &
Ehrhardt, 1972) in hopes of identifying biologically
based causes for the observed gender differences (see
Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman, 1978 for
review). However, recent reviews of the literature on
1
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sex differences in mathematical ability have ruled out
an innate ability difference as the primary causal
determinant of the discrepancy in male and female
performance at mathematical tasks (Fennema, 1977; Fox,
1977; Sherman, 1977). As Williams (1983) concludes,
"evidence for biological contributions to males'
superior performance in mathematics is weaker than it is
for spatial ability and accumulating evidence is more
supportive of socialization factors " (p. 135).
Therefore, further investigation of learning experiences
and socialization influences that are hypothesized to
contribute to differences in mathematical ability is
undertaken here.
One such promising area of investigation is the
application of Attribution Theory of Achievement
Motivation (ATAM)

(Weiner, 1972a; Weiner, 1972b; Weiner,

1974; Weiner, 1985; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, &
Rosenbaum, 1971) to the study of sex differences in
mathematical ability. It is the purpose of this study to
examine sex differences in causal attributions for a
mathematics task.

No attempt is made to empirically

validate a general theory which would apply to any task.
The latter is probably not possible (e.g., McHugh,
Fisher, & Frieze, 1982, for one example of
generalizability limitations), while the former may help
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explain male and female differences in level of
achievement for mathematically-related carrers like
accounting, computer science, and engineering which
typically of fer higher status and higher pay than
traditionally female dominated career areas (Fennema,
1977 cited in Pedro, Wolleat, Fennema, & Becker, 1981;
Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman, 1978;
Parsons, Meece, & Adler, 1982).

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Causal attributions for one's success or failure
is one of the three major areas cognitively oriented
research has focused on to understand sex differences in
achievement behavior (Frieze, Fisher, Hanusa, McHugh, &
Valle, 1978; Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman;
1978).

The other two major foci of research in this

area are the study of differential motives or values and
that men and women differentially define success.
Generally, degree and direction of attributions for
personal success or failure, as well as attributions
made by an observer to an actor, are expected to differ
depending on the sex of the person to whom the
attributions apply (the self or the actor).

Also, sex

differences in attributional patterns are expected to be
even more pronounced if the task is sex-typed, as is
mathematics (Wolleat, Pedro, Becker, & Fennema, 1980).
Attribution Theory
Attribution Theory of Achievement Motivation
springs from several more global theories of social
behavior: Heider's Theory of Phenomenal Causality
(1958), Kelley's Theory of External Attribution (1967),
Atkinson's Expectancy Value Theory of Achievement
Motivation (1964), Rotter's Reformulation of the Locus

4
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of Control Theory (1966), and Rosenbaum's Intentionality
concept (1972; cited in Weiner, 1979).
Attribution Theory is based on cognitive-behavior
theory, and thus has the "framework of an S-C-R model;
where C symbolizes causal cognition and S and R
represent stimulus-response or antecedent-consequent
relationships" (Weiner, 1976, p. 180).

A person's

attention to, thought about, and interpretation of
events is guided by assigning causes to these events
(Kelley, 1967; Shaw & Costanzo, 1982). Attributions are
cognitions which attempt to make sense out of events in
the context of the internal and external environment.
Attribution Theory's cognitive mediational
grounding thereby postulates individual variation in the
causal interpretation of any given event.

Individual's

ascriptions to causality are the focus of Attribution
Theory, and therefore, the theory addresses an
individual's perception of causality.

Yet, individual's

perceptions of causality are subject to distortions and
errors (Kelley, 1967).

According to Kelley (1967) there

are five potential sources of attributional errors:
ignoring a relevant situation; making egocentric
assumptions; one's emotions and self-esteem being
affected by relevant events; interpreting misleading
cues form the surrounding situation; and one's responses

6

being affected by hidden causal factors.

Specific

hypotheses concerning differential attributional errors
made by males and females from Weiner's perspective will
be a major focus of the present paper.
Attribution Theory focuses on

111

why 1 questions,

or the relationship between phenomena (effects) and the
reasons (responsible agents) for those events" (Weiner,
1972, p. 310) including the self. The answers to the
"why" questions are referred to as perceptions of
causality which Weiner (1972) defines as "the judgement
of why a particular response occurred" (p. 203). A
central assumption of Weiner's ATAM states that
comprehension of causality, a basic search for
understanding, is one of the primary sources of
motivation and behavior (Weiner, 1979).
Perceptions of causality are of central importance
according to attribution theorists.

Attribution

theorists propose perceptions of causality have a wide
ranging effect on behaviors, affects and cognitions.
ATAM proposes that an individual's search for
understanding often leads to attributional questioning,
a search of environmental cues and personal
characteristics to explain an outcome to the questioner
(Weiner, 1979). It is important to note that Attribution
Theory applies to both interpreting prior events (post-
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dieting) and predicting future events (Weiner, 1985).
Attribution Theory of Achievement Motivation
Attribution Theory of Achievement Motivation
(ATAM) consists of three dimensions of attributional
causality which serve as higher order conceptualizations
by which to organize the specific causes used in the
attributional questioning and ascription process. The
three dimensions of causality include: the locus of
causality (internality and externality), which is
theoretically based on work by Heider (1958) and Rotter
(1966); the stability dimension (stable versus unstable
causes), based again on Reider's work (1958); and the
dimension of controllability (controllable versus
uncontrollable causes) based on Heider (1958) and
Rosenbaum's concept of intentionality (1972, cited in
Weiner, 1979). These dimensions are presented in Table
1.

The theoretical foundations of the locus of
causality dimension are grounded, in part, in Rotter's
concept of locus of control.

Yet, an important

distinction must be made between locus of control
according to Rotter and the locus of causality in the
Attribution Theory framework. Attribution theorists
(Ickes & Layden, 1978) argue that Rotter does not make
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Table 1

~ribution

Theory of Achievement Motivation:

Causal

Dimensions and Causal Categories

Internal
Stable
Uncontrollable
Controllable

Ability
Typical
Effort

Unstable

Mood
Immediate
Effort

External
Stable

Unstable

Task

Luck

Teacher
Bias

Unusual
Help from
Others

9

the necessary distinction between "control" and
"causality" but uses both concepts interchangably.
Rotter's locus of control collapses the causality and
controllability dimension into a single dimension.

The

dinstinction between the two concepts can be illustrated
by considering "control" versus "cause" of a negative
event.

Control addresses the question of whether the

person has the power to change the negative event:
it within his or her power to control the event?

Is
On the

other hand, "causality" addresses the issue of whether
the subject caused the event or not:

Was the cause of

the event internal or external? Some events may be
causally attributed to either one or both controllable
and internal causes.
Weiner proposes that causes along each dimension
of causality

serve a particular purpose. Locus of

causality is related to self-esteem related affects.
Ascriptions along the stability dimension corresponds to
degree of expectancy change for future success.

And the

controllability dimension relates to the perceiver's
attributional evaluation of others (Weiner, 1985).
For the purposes of the present study, only the
two dimensions which were offered in the original
presentation of ATAM (Weiner et al., 1971) will be
utilized.

Judgments of causality along these two
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dimensions, locus of causality and stability,
differentially affect intrapersonal evaluation (Weiner,
1985). The present study shall focus on an individual's
causal attributions to himself or herself, or
intrapersonal evaluation, thereby focusing on
attributions regarding self-perception which are
addressed by the locus of causality and stability
dimensions.

Although the importance of also examining a

person's attributions to others has been documented
(Frieze, Fisher, Hanusa, & Valle, 1978).
The third dimension, controllability, mediates
attributional evaluation of others, which is not
addressed here. Although many additional causal
categories have been suggested (Weiner, 1979) and
generated by research (Frieze, 1976), general consensus
(Bar-Tal, 1978; Weiner, 1976; Weiner et al., 1971) and
empirical evidence (Freize, 1976) support the use of the
locus of causality and stability dimensions as those
which generate the most explanatory power.

It is

important to utilize these dimensions as Valle and
Frieze (1976) found that both the locus of causality
dimension and the stability dimension affect future
estimates of global success or failure and the degree
rating of success or failure.

A 2x2 summary table of
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Weiner's original causal categories is presented
(Table 2).
According to Weiner, individuals may use one or
many causal categories to evaluate a given outcome
event.

In the original presentation of ATAM (Weiner et

al., 1971) as reworded by Weiner (1979) the authors
postulated that in achievement-related contexts the
causes perceived as most responsible for success and
failure are ability, effort, task difficulty, and
luck.
That is, in attempting to explain prior
success or failure for an achievement-related event,
the individual assesses his or her ability, the
amount of effort that was expended, the difficulty
of the task, and the magnitude and direction of the
experienced luck.
(The authors) ... assumed that
rather general values are assigned to these factors
and that the task outcome is differentially ascribed
to the causal sources.
(Weiner, 1979, p. 4)
The four causal categories mentioned above, which
will be assessed in the present study, may be classified
according to the pair of dimensional attributes which
characterize each:

ability is an internal, stable

cause; effort is an internal, unstable cause; task is an
external, stable cause; and luck is an external,
unstable cause (see Table 2).
The number of causal categories used to explain a
given outcome is dependent on the expectancy (Atkinson,
1964) of that outcome.

"In sum, when performance

outcomes are uncommon (unexpected), attributions tend to
include multiple causes; when performance outcomes are

12

Table 2
Attribution Theory of Achievement Motivation:
original Causal Dimensions and Causal Categories

~-L_o_cus

of Causality
External

Stability

Internal

Stable

Ability

Task

Unstable

Effort

Luck/Environment
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common (expected), attributions are made to only one
cause" (Weiner, 1985, p. 342; parentheses added).

For

example, when a person expects to fail at a given task,
Atkinson proposes that the person will tend to use
several causes such as ability, effort and luck to
explain the outcome.

When a person anticipates success,

Atkinson theorizes that the person will attribute the
outcome to one causes such as ability.
Not only does the number of causes used vary, the
frequency with which a cause is used also varies.
Individuals, according to Weiner (1985), are predisposed
to use certain attributional categories more heavily
than others.

There is a degree of flexibility within

the attribution framework to understand individual
differences in the use of causal attributions.
Investigations in this area have grouped individuals,
particularly by sex, to study the differential use of
causal attributions, reasons for differential use, and
consequences of differential use for each group.
Investigations of this sort will be discussed in greater
detail below.
In addition to using multiple causal categories,
individuals use multiple cues to reach causal inferences
(Weiner, 1972; Weiner, 1985; Weiner et al., 1971). The
antecedents, or cues, used to infer attributions of
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causality include number and percent of prior successes
and failures, pattern of performance, primacy and
recentness effects, social norms, maximum level of
performance, time spent at the task, and covariation of
the outcomes with performance incentives.
More specifically, ability attributions are made
dependent on the "degree of the past success at that and
similar tasks" (Weiner et al., 1971, p. 5) Thus, the
consistency and generality of performance are important
cues regarding ability attributions. Comparisons to
others or groups of others and the maximum performance
level achieved, which indicates peak capabilities, are
also important cues regarding ability attributions.
Effort attributions are dependent on cues such as·
muscular tension, task persistence, and pattern of
performance (increased attribution to effort when
performance improves over time). But effort is most
often a post-hoc attribution made after the outcome is
known (Weiner, 1985; Weiner et al., 1971). Attributions
to task difficulty are "inferred from social norms
indicating the performance of others at the task''
(Weiner et al., 1971, p. 5). If many succeed, the task
is thought to be easy. If many fail, it is assumed to be
difficult. More minor cues for attributions to task
difficulty are characteristics of the task, such as
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length complexity and novelty (Weiner, 1985). Finally,
attributions to luck are "inferred from the pattern of
prior reinforcements: the more random or variable in
pattern of outcomes, the higher the probability that
luck will be perceived as a causal influence" (Weiner et
al., 1971, p. 5).

Other cues used to make luck

attributions include the type of task and prior unique
events salient to the person (Weiner, 1985).
Causality and Affective Reactions
Early writings on ATAM hypothesized the importance
of the dimensions of locus of causality and stability in
understanding the consequences of making a particular
causal attribution. Specifically, it was hypothesized
that attributions along the locus of causality dimension
influence affective reactions of the person to goal
attainment, and the attributions made along the
stability dimension influence the person's expectancy
for future change (Weiner, 1974). Correlates of the
stability dimension will be addressed shortly.
Weiner's hypothesis concerning affective reactions
to goal attainment corresponding to causal categories is
grounded in Atkinson's proposed general dispositions: to
seek success for the purpose of generating pride, and to
avoid failure so one avoids shame that would be
generated by failing (Atkinson, 1964). Atkinson also
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hypothesized that one takes greater pride in the
accomplishment of a difficult task than an easy one, and
one experiences greater shame at failing at an easy task
than at a difficult one (Atkinson, 1964). Shame and
pride were considered the dominant affects in
achievement-related situations (Atkinson, 1964;
McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953).
Therefore, Weiner's and Atkinson's original
hypotheses proposed affective reactions to goal
attainment were dependent on whether the attributional
cause used was an internal or an external one. Emotional
reactions were assumed to be strongest given internal or
self-esteem related attributions and weakest given
external reactions (Weiner, 1979; Weiner, Russell, &
Lerman, 1978). But, empirically the proposed degree of
strength or weakness of reaction along the internalexternal dimension and the pride-shame emotional
dichotomy is unsupported (Weiner, 1977). Instead, a
variety of emotions can result from causal attributions
and these emotions result from ascriptions to each of
the four causal categories (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman,
1978). Therefore, the locus of causality is not
considered a moderator variable for affective reactions,
but instead emotions relate more directly to each causal
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category in a unique way (Weiner, 1979; Weiner, Russell,

& Lerman, 1978).
Research in this area asked subjects to generate a
free-response list of potential affective responses to
success and failure events (Frieze, 1976). Subsequently,
subjects were asked to report the affective intensity of
each response that would be experienced in a given
success or failure situation (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman,
1978). The findings, which have been integrated into
more recent writings on ATAM (Weiner, 1985), are
threefold.
First, outcome of the task mediates an overall
positive or negative emotional reaction. Success results
in positive or "good" feelings, while failure results in
negative or "bad" feelings.
Secondly, distinct emotions are most frequently
paired with each causal category. For instance, a
success attribution to ability elicits foremost a
feeling of worth; whereas a success attribution to luck
results mostly in surprise.

(See Weiner, 1985 for a

complete list.)
Finally, the causality dimension does play a role
in mediating self-ascriptions or self-esteem related
affects (internal versus external attributions), and
thereby attaches a "pride" or "shame" emotional
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component to the emotional reactions described above.
Empirical evidence generated by others has
supported Weiner's more recent proposition and has found
that success, especially on difficult tasks, leads to
positive affective responses; and failures, especially
on easy tasks, leads to negative affective response
(Ruble, Parsons, & Ross, 1976). Therefore, Atkinson's
(1964) hypothesis concerning the amount of affective

reaction to a success versus a failure at a difficult or
easy task is partially supported. However, instead of
considering pride and shame as the dominant emotions
experienced, a more careful consideration of each causal
category as well as the outcome is necessary to
determine the type of affect(s) most likely to be
expericed.
CausalitY._1!.nd Ex2ectancies
Weiner hypothesized that the dimension of
stability plays a crucial role in determining a person's
expectancy for success or failure. The cognitive
reactions to a task, in the form of post-dictive
attributions for an outcome, relate to the
direction and the magnitude of expectancy change
(Weiner, 1974; Weiner, 1976) to the degree to which the
outcome is attributed to a stable cause versus an
unstable cause. Theorists have argued (Phares, 1957.;
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Weiner, 1972; Weiner, 1976) that as the degree of
attribution to a.stable factor increases after success,
the expectancy of future success increases.

For

example, as a person increases his or her attribution to
ability or task difficulty following a successful
outcome, his or her future expectancy for success will
increase.

Likewise, as the degree of attribution to an

unstable factor after failure increases, the expectancy
for future success also increases because this pattern
leaves one's positive self-perception of ability intact
(Merton, 1946).

The person is able to disregard the

failure outcome as a fluke event, and continue to
anticipate the chance for a future success.
Therefore, a subject's expectancy for future
change is strongest when one attributes an outcome to an
unstable cause such as effort or luck. Effort and luck
operate uncertainly at any point in time, so that for
future events one may more easily exert more effort or
one's luck may improve. It is less likely that one would
be able to change ability at a task or make a given task
easier. Since ability and the task difficulty are less
likely to change over time, one has lower expectancies
for change in these stable areas (Bar-Tal, 1978). These
hypotheses have been verified by numerous empirical
studies (McMahan, 1973; Ostrove, 1978; Rest, Nierenberg,
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Weiner, & Heckhausen, 1973; Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, &
Cook, 1972; Weiner & Kukla, 1970; Weiner, Nierenberg, &
Goldstein, 1976).
Causal attributions are viewed as partially
determining an individual's affective experience,
cognitive representations of future expectancies and
behavioral reactions to a success or failure experience
on an achievement-related task (Weiner et al, 1971).
Attributions are expected to systematically relate to
several major areas of one's functioning including
affective reactions and cognitive reactions such as
expectancies for future performance.

Also related are

behavioral consequences such as performance intensity,
which is dependent on attributions along the stability
dimension, and task persistence, which relates to
attributions along the causality dimension (Dweck,
Davidson, Nielson, & Enna, 1978). Weiner (1985) presents
the above relationship as a type of a chain reaction in
which attributions affect expectancies and emotions,
which in turn, affect choice of, intensity of, and
persistence of behavior.
Empirical evidence supports these hypotheses
(Feather, 1969; Feather & Simon, 1971; Rest, 1976;
Weiner et al., 1978; Lawrence & Festinger, 1962) and
suggests attributions are related to actual subsequent
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achievement levels for laboratory and field tasks
(Dweck, Davidson, Nelson, & Enna, 1978; Dweck & Repucci,
1973; Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972), and to
continued course taking in mathematics (Pedro, Wolleat,
Fennema, & Becker, 1981).
Research in the area of causal attributions to
success or failure has found the effect of the task
outcome on causal attributions to be a salient factor,
thus confirming the post-dictive as well as pre-dictive
nature of attributions (Weiner, 1985).

Students who

succeed at a task generally attribute causality for this
outcome largely to internal cues such as ability and
effort, while students who fail attribute causality
largely to external cues such as luck and task
difficulty (Arkin & Maruyama, 1979; Sweeney, Moreland, &
Gruber, 1982).

This issue shall be addressed in the

present paper.
Attribution Theory of Achievement Motivation has
been applied to a wide variety of achievement areas and
cognitive abilities including mathematical ability
(Eccles, Adler, Futterman, Goff, Kaczala, Meece, &
Midgley, 1983; Eccles, Adler, & Meece, 1984; Leder,
1982, cited in Leder, 1984; Parsons, Meece, Adler, &
Kaczala, 1982; Pedro, Wolleat, Fennema, & Becker, 1981;
Wolleat, Pedro, Becker, & Fennema, 1980).

ATAM has also
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been applied to other aspects of behavior such as
depression, loneliness and affiliation, hyperactivity,
mastery and parole decisions (Weiner, 1979).
ATAM is particularly applicable to the issue of
sex differences (and racial differences; see Katz, 1967
for discussion) in specific cognitive abilities.

ATAM

provides an example of "how characteristics other than
cognitive skills may affect an individual's performance
on achievement tasks" (Bar-Tal, 1978; p. 266).

"Females

and individuals with certain causal perceptions may
perform below their abilities because of their
maladaptive patterns of attributions" (Bar-Tal, 1978, p.
267). The maladaptive patterns of attributions
potentially adversely affect expectancies, emotional
experiences, and behaviors which all appear to correlate
with success experiences.
Perhaps investigating attributional patterns will
be useful in further exploring the ways in which women
and men differentially ascribe causality for success and
failure experiences in the area of mathematics. By
narrowing the focus of the present study to a specific
task, mathematics in a noncompetitive setting,
generalizability of the findings to other tasks will be
limited. But these limitations are necessary because
factors such as sex-role appropriations of the task
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(McHugh, Fisher, & Frieze, 1982), the competitiveness of
the setting (Teglasi, 1977), and the type of task
(Levine & Uleman, 1979) have been shown to relate to sex
differences in attributional patterns.
ATAM and Sex Differences
Causal attributions for one's success or failure
is one of the three major areas cognitively oriented
research has focused on to understand sex differences in
achievement behavior (Frieze, Fisher, Hanusa, McHugh, &
Valle, 1978; Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman,
1978).

The other major areas of research include the

study of differential motives and values and
differential definitions of success between males and
females.

Generally, degree and direction of

attributions for personal success or failure, as well as
attributions made by an observer to an actor, are
expected to differ depending on the sex of the person to
whom the attributions apply (the self or the actor).
Also, sex differences in attributional patterns are
expected to be even more pronounced if the task is sextyped, as is mathematics (Wolleat, Pedro, Becker, &
Fennema, 1980).
However, because the authors of ATAM have not
articulated specific predictions concerning sex
differences in causal attributions for achievement-
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oriented tasks, the result has been two-fold. First,
researchers have generated several models based on
Weiner et al. 's (1971) original conceptualization while
also drawing on other more general theories of behavior
and sex differences. These models, in turn, have
specified more exact hypotheses concerning sex
differences in achievement behavior including actual
acievement, course taking behavior, and expectancies for
future performance (Dweck et al., 1978; Dweck, &
Repucci, 1973; Fontaine, 1974; McMahan, 1973; Ostrove,
1978; Valle & Frieze, 1976; Weiner, 1972a; Weiner,
Niernberg, & Goldstein, 1976).
Yet, researchers in this area have not compared
the predictive power of the models, nor have they
consistently specified predictions for each of the four
causal categories within any given model. Instead
research has often made predictions for sex differences
occurring in one or two of the cells depicted in Table
2, but has ignored the remaining cells, the higher-order
dimensions of causality and their correlates.
Nicholls (1975) said more than ten years ago that
"previous studies of causal judgments after success and
failure do not all make the joint distinction between
internal-external and stable-unstable causes" (p. 387),
but little note was taken. Many years and publications
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later, few papers have presented the three models and
subjected all three to empirical verification. This
study will present the three major models, and attempt
to empirically test their predictions.
Three Models for Predicting Sex Differences in Causal
Attributions
EXTERNALITY MODEL
This model contends that women tend to make
external attributions for both success and failure,
while men tend to make internal attributions for both
events. Several versions of the Externality model offer
different explanations, yet make the same predictions,
and therefore are merged under the Externality label
{Table 3).
Horner's {1969) conceptions of "fear of success"
and "fear of failure" are used to explain women's
withdrawl from achievement situations. The "fears" are
motivational forces that interact with conceptions of
one's sex role. Particularly feminine identified females
may be more motivated to avoid success because of the
possible negative consequences (e.g. male disapproval)
of doing as well or better than a male on a task {Simon

& Feather, 1973). Following withdrawl from achievement
situations, it is hypothesized that women lose touch
with the internal causes that correlate with their
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Table 3
Hypotheses from Three Models concerning Causal
Attributions for Success and Failure by Sex

Task Outcome
Sue~

Model

Ability

Effort

Task

Luck

Externality
females
males

Low
High

Low
High

High
Low

High
Low

Self-Derogatory
females
males

Low
High

Low
High

High
Low

High
Low

Low Expectancy
females
males

Low
High

High
Low

Low
High

High
Low

-------------------------------------------------------Outcome
--- Task
Success

Ability

Effort

Externality
females
males

Low
High

Low
High

High
Low

High
Low

Self-Derogatory
females
males

High
Low

High
Low

Low
High

Low
High

Low Expectancy
females
males

High
Low

Low
High

High
Low

Low
High

Model
----

Task

Luck
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subsequent successes and failures.

Women rely solely on

external cues to determine where they may attribute
causality (Deaux, 1976; Feather, 1969; Simon & Feather,
1973).

In other words, the model suggests women depend

on an external locus of causality to mediate judgments
of causality.

They attribute any outcome, whether

success or failure,

to the luck and/or task difficulty

causal categories.
A second source for hypotheses that fall under the
Externality Model originate from a sociological
perspective.

Women and other low-status groups, such as

racial minorities, tend to perceive that they have less
control over outcomes, and probably do have less control
in some instances, than higher-status males and other
high-status groups.

The cumulative effect of

continually perceiving and experiencing lessened control
gives them the expectation and experience of attributing
causality for both successes and failures to external
forces (Merton, 1968; Wiley, Crittenden, & Birg, 1979).
As a result of making this pattern of causal
attributions for success and failure,

"past performance

does not provide a basis for generalization to future
trials since S [the subject] is not the effective agent
in obtaining reinforcements" (Phares, 1957, p.341).
person ascribing causality in an external manner

The
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perceives him- or herself at the mercy of environmental
influences.
Sweeney, Moreland, and Gruber (1982) have argued
that the characterization of women as external is not as
important as the portrayl of men and objectively
successful women as internally determined.

Their

argument for the "internality bias" among men relates
this pattern of attributions to the need for internal
control of outcomes as part of the male sex role.
Empirical support for the Externality model has
been mixed.

In operationalizing the model many

researchers neglected to include hypotheses for all four
causal categories (e.g., Deaux, 1976; Deaux & Farris,
1977, experiment 1; Feather & Simon, 1973; Phares, 1957;
Wiley et al., 1979).

The latter only make predictions

for the causal categories of ability and luck:

males or

those with higher general control attribute causality to
ability (internal-stable) more often than women; women
or those with low general control attribute causality to
luck (external-unstable) more often than men.

Support

for the predictions concerning the ability and luck
causal categories has been fairly consistent and
confirmatory.
Despite the lack of consistency in testing the
Externality model, several studies do provide a starting
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point for evaluating the model's predictions for all
four causal categories.

Feather (1969), Simon and

Feather (1973), and Wiley et al.

(1979) report that

females make higher attributions to external factors
than males regardless of the task outcome, and that
males utilize the internal attribution categories more
often than do females.

Additional support for the

Externality model can be found by examining the mean
attributional ratings by sex in studies that do not test
all of the hypotheses generated by the models.

This

process yields varying degrees of support for the
Externality model {Bar-Tal & Darom, 1979; Bar-Tal &
Frieze, 1977; Deaux & Farris, 1977; McArthur, 1976).
SELF-DEROGATORY MODEL
The Self-Derogatory model, as it shall be referred
to in the present paper, has appeared under multiple
labels in the Attribution Theory literature.

It has

also been termed Learned Helplessness {Diener & Dweck,
1978; Dweck & Bush, 1976; Dweck, Davidson, Nelson,

&

Enna, 1978; Dweck & Gotez, 1978; Dweck & Reppucci, 1973;
Wolleat et al., 1980), Self-Defeating {Heilman & Kram,
1978), and Attributional Egotism in referrence to male's
attributional style (Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977; Snyder,
Stephan, & Rosenfield, & Stephan, 1976).
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This model assumes women tend to be lower in
amount of self-esteem than men, and thus attribute
failure to internal characteristics of themselves in a
self-derogatory manner.

Females attribute success to

external causes such as an easy task and good luck while
males display this attributional pattern in response to
failures.

"Causal Attributions of males tend to

resemble those of high self-esteem subjects, whereas the
responses of females on the same measures resemble those
of low eslf-esteem subjects" (Ickes, & Layden, 1978,
p.124).
Therefore, the model proposes women take personal
responsibility for a failure, but they do not take any
credit for a success (Crandall, Katkowsky, & Crandall,
1965; Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977; Frieze, Fisher, Hanusa,
McHugh, & Valle, 1978(a); Ickes & Layden, 1978; Levine,
Gillman, & Reis, 1982; Nicholls, 1975).

Women "see

themselves as responsible only for negative, not for
positive, performance outcomes" (Heilman & Kram, 1978,
p.497).

Given the actual equivalence of males and

females in many achievement-related tendencies (Maccoby,

& Jacklin, 1974), one would expect females to learn to
respect their abilities and efforts once they have the
opportunity to experience success (Heilman & Kram,
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1978).

But this is not the case according to the Self-

Derogatory model.
For women their attributional style "perpetuates a
self-fulfilling cycle of negative self-regard" (Heilman

& Kram, 1978, p. 498) because it dismisses any favorable
information and embraces personal responsibility for
negative information.
Men, who generally report higher levels of selfesteem for achievement tasks (Snyder, Stephan, &
Rosenfield, 1976; Frieze et al., 1978a), are
hypothesized to exhibit the opposite pattern of causal
attributions (Heilman & Kram, 1978; Ickes & Layden,
1978)

(see Table 3). This pattern has been termed a

self-serving bias (Arkin & Marvyama, 1979), selfenhancing (Levine & Gillman, 1982) and egotistical
(Stephan et al., 1976; Snyder et al., 1978). Egocentric
attributions, as those made by males, have been
"interpreted as evidence for a self-serving motivational
bias which functions to protect self-esteem and/or the
self-perception process" (Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977, p.
215-216) by attributing success (an expected outcome) to
internal factors and failure (unexpected) to external
factors. The motivation bias is a need to maintain the
best possible image of oneself (Snyder et al., 1978).
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Levine et al.

(1982) have explicated the process

by which the self-enhancing bias operates for men:
It is assumed that such a cognitive bias will allow
the individual to incorporate favorable information
and exclude unfavorable information from his or her
self-concept ... (while) a self-derogatory bias
would lead to exactly the opposite pattern - greater
attribution of success to external and failure to
internal causes. In this manner, positive cognitions
are excluded from the self-concept, while negative
information is incorporated.
(p. 455-456)
Results of the proposed attributional styles for
males and females indicate several potential outcomes.
First, if females attribute failure internally, the
result will be decreased motivation following failure
which interferes with actual task performance (Ickes &
Layden, 1978).
Secondly, the consequences of this attributional
pattern on self-referent affects should be considered
more closely. Failure experiences tend to reinforce
feelings of low self-esteem, whereas successful
experiences will tend to reinforce feelings of high
self-esteem (Fitch, 1970). High and low self-esteem
related to task performance might be better termed selfefficacy (Bandura, 1977) or a person's estimate of how
well he or she can perform a given task.

Levine and

Uleman (1979) recommend thinking of self-esteem within
this model in terms of the specific task.

Women will

tend to perpetuate their low self-efficacy for a task by
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attributing success to external factors. They,
therefore, avoid positive feelings about their
accomplishments and do not increase self-efficacy.

But

women do experience negative self-evaluative feelings
for their failures and decrease self-efficacy after a
failure (Arkin & Marvyama, 1979; Atkinson, 1964).
Empirical support for the Self-Derogatory model
has also been mixed. As is the case with empirical
evidence for the Externality model, researchers do not
always evaluate all four causal categories in the
analysis of their data. However, Stephan et al.

(1976)

found empirical support for both a self-derogatory
attributional pattern among female subjects and an
egotistical attributional patern among the males. Snyder
et al.

(1976) also found an egotistical pattern among

males, but found the pattern for females was dependent
on the sex of their partner. Females produced the
expected attributional pattern when paired with a male
partner, but an egotistial pattern resulted when they
were paired with another female.
Contridictory to predictions made by the SelfDerogatory model, Feather (1969) reports that actual
measures of
rating.

self-e~teem

did not predict attributional
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LOW EXPECTANCY MODEL
The third major model to be presented assumes that
females generally have lower expectancies for success
than men at achievement-related tasks.

The Low

Expectancy model hypothesizes females will tend to
predict they will not succeed, and they will
consistently expect a low level of performance.
Therefore, when success is experienced, it will be seen
as an unstable, fluke event.

Failure will confirm the

low expectancy and reinforce failure attributions to
stable causal categories (Fennema, Reyes, Perl, Konsin,

& Drakensberg, 1980; Frieze et al., 1978a; McMahan,
1973; Pedro, Wolleat, Fennema, & Becker, 1981; Valle &
Frieze, 1976; Weiner, 1976; Wolleat et al., 1980).
"Failure, being more consistent with females'
expectations, will receive the stable attributions of
causality, ability and task difficulty" (Deaux, 1976, p.
358).
By discounting success and considering failure as
indicating stable attributes, females prevent raising
their expectations for future tasks and actually lower
these expectations.
A person who is initially expected to do poorly
(whether because of race, age, sex, or lack of
education) will find it
difficult to change these
low expectations. If the individual is successful,
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this will be attributed to unstable traits and will
have little influence on later expectations
(Valle & Frieze, 1976, p. 586) (see Table 3).
Empirical evidence for the Low Expectancy model
includes the work of a variety of authors (Bond &
Deming, 1982; Deaux, 1976; Leder, 1984; McMahan, 1973;
Parsons et al., 1982; Weigers & Frieze, 1977; Wolleat et
al., 1980).

As with the preceding two models, many of

the researchers did not make hypotheses concerning all
four causal categories or report their results in terms
of the categories and the two dimensions which superpose
the causes.
The Low Expectancy model may prove to be
particularly salient for studying sex differences on a
stereotypical masculine task, such as math, as it has
been suggested that women have exaggeratedly low
expectancies for these tasks (Deaux, 1976).
Meta-Analysis and Methodological Issues
To assess which of these models is best supported
by existing empirical data Frieze, Whitley, Hanusa, and
McHugh (1982) performed a meta-analysis on 19 studies
which assessed sex differences in causal ratings for
success and failure experiences. The sample was limited
to those studies using adolescent and adult subjects.
Overall, the meta-analysis found few consistent sex
differences. When women succeed they are more likely
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than men to see the task as easy (an external, stable
attribution). Regardless of outcome (success or failure)
men view themselves as possessing more ability than
women, and men are less likely to say luck was
responsible for an outcome than women.
Yet, several potentially critical variables and a
set of hypotheses were not addressed in the metaanal ysis. First, the sex-type of the task was not
considered when performing the meta-analysis, although
this is a potentially critical variable in the study of
sex differences in causal attributions research (Frieze
et al., 1982). Eccles et al.

(1984) point out that more

consistent differences may emerge if investigations
would focus on sex-typed tasks such as mathematics and
English because sex differences in causal attributions
are strongest for sex-typed achievement tasks. Only a
few studies have looked at sex differences in causal
attributions for math tasks (e.g., Parsons, Meece,
Adler, & Kaczala, 1982) despite these precautionary
statements.
Secondly, only studies which utilized adult and
adolescent subjects were included in the meta-analysis,
despite empirical evidence that attributional patterns
are established fairly early. Bond and Deming (1982)
conclude from their research that "different
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attributional patterns for explaining male and female
performance appear well established by seven-eight years
of age and remain strikingly stable through development''
(p. 1205).
Finally, no predictions were made for men's
attributional patterns although the models do specify
such patterns (see Table 3).
More recent studies focusing on sex differences in
causal attributions for success and failure in
mathematics have produced mixed results and have failed
to plan a test of all three models presented here:
Externality, Self-Derogatory, and Low Expectancy. For
example, Eccles et al. 's (1984) conclusions support both
the Self-Derogatory and Low Expectancy models, but makes
no test of the dissimilar predictions made by the
models. Leder's (1984) results most closely conform to
the predictions made by the Low Expectancy model, but
again, no analyses aimed at testing the complete model
are made.
Several minor, but potentially critical,
components have been lacking in past studies applying
Attribution Theory to sex differences in mathematics
ability. Eccles (1984) points out the need for studies
on school specific areas and achievement tasks presented
in naturalistic settings to increase external validity
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of experimental findings. Also, there has been little
consistency in the type of attributional measuring
device used. In their meta-analysis of this area, Frieze
et al.

(1982) separated studies using "causal" wording

from those using "informational" wording. The
Mathematics Attribution Scale (MAS)

(Wolleat, Pedro,

Becker, & Fennema, 1980), a step in remedying
inconsistencies which utilizes informational wording,
has published norms for adolescents and has been used in
several investigations (Leder, 1982; Pedro, Wolleat,
Fennema, & Becker, 1981).
The sex of the experimenter, although this
variable has been shown to have a significant effect on
sex differentiated performance on experimental tasks
(Harris, 1971), particularly when a mathematics task is
the performance measure (Pedersen, Shinedling, &
Johnson, 1968), has not been controlled, manipulated, or
even reported in much of the research in this area.
Competitiveness and cooperativeness of the task
performance setting has been found to influence
attributional patterns for males and females and the
findings from these studies to date seems to generalize
to other settings (McHugh, Frieze, & Hanusa, 1982).
However, settings that require neither competetiveness
nor cooperativeness between pairmates are needed in the
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area of attribution research for sex differences in
achievement motivation (Teglasi, 1977). Also, prompting
attributional statements by measuring them before the
experimental task will not be utilized in the present
study, as it has been hypothesized to differentially
affect male and female attributional statements when
measured following task feedback (Fitch,

1970). Finally,

a limited use of minority subjects has hindered the
generalizability of past research efforts (Frieze,
Fisher, Hanusa, McHugh, & Valle, 1978).
A formal exposition of the three models presented
and the hypotheses the models generate has been very
limited in the research literature on sex differences in
causal attributions for achievement tasks.

(Frieze et

al., 1982). A planned investigation of the
interpretations of Weiner's Attribution Theory of
Achievement Motivation to sex differences in mathematics
(and other sex stereotyped tasks) would be a valuable
contribution to the research literature in this area.
The present study attempts to partially fill this
gap by comparing and contrasting the three models in the
limited achievement/cognitive area of mathematical
ability, and by addressing the methodological flaws of
past studies as is possible within the scope of the
present project.

METHOD
~ubj~cts

The subjects were 63 undergraduate students
enrolled in Introductory Psychology at a mid-sized
Catholic University, located in a major U.S. city.
Subjects volunteered for the experiment in exchange for
course credit. Subjects were 34 females and 29 males.
Their mean age was 18.83 years, with a range of 17 to 22
years. Fourty-seven subjects were White, 11 were Black,
three were Asian, and two were Hispanic.

There were no

significant differences between the age or ethnicity of
male and female subjects. Subjects had a mean of 3.52
years of high school mathematics and .71 semesters of
college mathematics. There were no significant sex
differences on the two measures of mathematics coursetaking behavior, although male subjects consistently
reported taking more math in high school and in college
than female subjects.
Task
Subjects were informed that the purpose of the
study is to assess the math and verbal abilities of
college students. They were asked t6 complete the math
and spelling sections of the Wide Range Achievement test
(WRAT)

(1979). This assessment tool is used widely in
40

41
educational and vocational counseling settings to
classify subjects according to grade level of
achievement (kindergarten through a grade 20 achievement
level) in each area assessed. Subjects are given ten
minutes to complete the math subtest while completion of
the orally administered spelling test varies. The WRAT,
as it was administered in the present study, is
considered a noncompetitive, as well as noncooperative,
task. Task performance, scoring, and task outcome are
all individual, and are not dependent on other subjects.
lndependent Variables
An approximately equal number of male and female
subjects were recruited for the experiment. Males and
females were randomly assigned to the two levels of the
second independent variable (success and failure)
described below.
There was one manipulated independent variable:
success or failure feedback on the math test. Success
was arbitrarily defined as ten points above the national
average of college students taking this test, while
failure was defined as ten points below the national
average of college students. All subjects received
neutral feedback (within the average expected range of
college students taking this test) for the spelling
test.
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The decision to give false test feedback to
subjects was made to control for the selection threat to
internal validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979) as when
essentially different pre-existing groups, such as males
and females, receive different experimental treatments,
such as success or failure feedback on a test. Since
males consistently outperform females on measures of
mathematical achievement, a pre-existing difference
between the groups is operating. Without randomized
subject assignment, relatively more females would
receive failure feedback and relatively more males would
receive success feedback.
A third potential independent variable, sex of the
experimenter, was controlled by using a male-female coexperimenter team. Future research in this area needs to
manipulate this variable to partial out each independent
variable's effects (Harris,

1971; Pedersen, Shinedling,

& Johnson, 1968). However, this manipulation was beyond
the scope of the present study.
Q_e_pende~!_Y.~!:..!..~12..1 e

Mea§_'.:!_re§_

The subject's causal attribution statements, the
dependent variable, was measured by a modified version
of the Mathematics Attribution Scale (MAS)

(Fennema,

Wolleat, & Pedro, 1982) after receiving false
performance feedback.
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The MAS, a five-point Likert scale, was designed
for use with high school students to measure their
causal attributions to success and failure experiences
in mathematics. Algebra and geometry were chosen as
representative high school mathematics courses. Two
versions of the test were developed, one for each of
these subjects.

The MAS is comprised of eight

subscales, one for each attributional causal category
paired with success or failure events. It is a unique
attribution instrument in several ways. First, by
treating attributions to success and failure events as
independent, the MAS is able to assess the attributional
categories separately for success and failure. Secondly,
the MAS renames the "luck" causal category in ATAM.
It's new name, "environment", was chosen as a more
appropriate name covering "the wider range of unstable,
external attributions" (Wolleat et al., 1980, p. 359)
that have been classified as fitting in this category by
empirical data (Frieze, 1976; Wolleat et al., 1980)
Table 2) .

(see

See Appendix A for the version of the MAS

used in the present study.
Scores for the eight attribution subscales are
obtained by summing each of the four categories of
attribution statements across Success event stems
and doing the same for the Failure stems. Subscale
scores can range from four to 20. There is no
meaningful overall score. Reliability coefficients
obtained . . . on the MAS subscales via the Cronbach
alpha technique were Success-Ability=.77; Success-
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Effort=.79; Success-Task=.39; SuccessEnvironment=.48; Failure-Ability=.63; FailureEffort=.66; Failure-Task=.48; and FailureEnvironment=.48
(Wolleat et al., 1980, p. 359).
The MAS was modified slightly for use in the
present study according to Fennema et al. 's (1982)
instructions for modification. Reference is made to a
generic math task versus the specified subjects of
algebra and geometry to accomodate subjects who have a
varied background in math. Also, wording of the causal
statements was altered slightly to make the scale
consistent with assessment of a single testing time
versus assessment of performance over a longer period of
time, such as a semester (see Appendix A).
The MAS and the modified version used here allows
subjects to attribute causality for both success and
failure outcomes to four possible causal sources:
ability, effort, task and luck. These causal sources lie
on two dimensions, stability and locus of causality, as
illustrated in Table 2. No restriction on responses was
made because Weiner (1985) suggests subjects use a
varying number of attributional categories to explain an
event.

Although preceding studies have restricted

responses to conform to the reciprocal nature of withinperson and outside-person causal attributions (Fitch,
1970) as specified by Reider's (1958) theory.

45

Design
The design of the experiment conforms to a 2
(individual feedback: success vs. failure) by 2 (sex of
the subject: female vs. male) factorial design. The
total design consists of four experimental conditions
with approximately 15 subjects per cell (17 females in
each of the success and failure task outcome conditions,
15 males in the success outcome condition, and 14 males
in the failure outcome condition). Random assignment to
experimental groups was achieved by assigning subjects
to the success or failure conditions alternately for
each sex.

Specifically, subjects were assigned an

identification number upon arrival to the experimental
sessions. Females were given numbers one through 10, 2130, and 41-50. Males were given numbers 11-20, 31-40,
and 51-60. All odd-numbered subjects were assigned to
the failure condition, and even numbered subjects to the
success condition. Therefore, the only experimentally
determined component of the randomization process was
the placement of the first two subjects of each sex in
the failure or success conditions, with the first
subjects for each sex (failure condition) arriving to
the experimental session before the second subjects
(success condition). Thereafter, half of the success
condition subjects arrived before the other half of the
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success condition subjects for any experimental session.
The same process was in effect for the failure condition
subjects. Finally, no limitation (minimum or maximum)
was put on the number of or sex of the subjects who
signed up for each experimental session. Therefore,
after the first experimental session, the alternate
assignment process to success or failure conditions
continued where the preceeding session left off. Subject
assignment for second, third, etc. sessions was
constrained only by the number of and sex of the
subjects in previous sessions, and was not
experimentally manipulated.
Subjects were tested in groups over the course of
the college semester. The experimental setting utilized
was a typical college classroom adjacent to currently
used classrooms in an effort to increase the external
validity of any experimental findings by conducting the
experiment in a naturalistic setting for an achievement
task (Eccles, 1984).
Procedure

-~~~~

Subjects were introduced to the experimental
procedure with a brief oral description of the
experiment. Subjects were informed that the purpose of
the study was to assess the math and English abilities
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of college students in light of the recent concern over
the decline in these scores over all age groups. They
then completed the math and spelling sections of the
WRAT, which contains 55 and 46 items respectively.
Subjects were asked to f i l l out several questionnaires
which served as filler tasks while one experimenter
prepared the test feedback. Following completion of the
questionnaires, the experimenters provided feedback for
each individual's performance on both portions of the
WRAT. Feedback was expressed in relation to a national
average of college students. Subjects then filled out an
adaptation of the MAS, providing a measure of causal
attributions.
Finally, the subjects were completely debriefed,
both orally and in written form. The nature of the
deception was explained and they were assured that the
feedback they received in no way reflected their actual
performance. Any questions were answered at this time,
and the author of this paper encouraged subjects to
contact her if they had any questions, concerns,
comments or interests in the study. No such contacts
were made, so it is assumed that no lasting negative
effects resulted from the experimental manipulation of
the success and failure feedback.

RESULTS
Before the analyses of the dependent measures used
to test the hypotheses are discussed, several points of
clarification and preliminary analyses will be
presented.
The eight dependent measures, Success-Ability,
Success-Effort, Success-Task, Success-Environment,
Failure-Ability, Failure-Effort, Failure-Task, FailureEnvironment, subscales of the MAS, each produce scores
that may range from four to 20. A score of four
represents strong disagreement that the particular
causal category being rated had an influence on the
corresponding success or failure as described in each
item's

scenario. A score of 20 indicates strong

agreement that the particular category was an influence
on the task outcome depicted.
in Appendix A.

A sample MAS is included

The actual range of scores is listed in

Table 4, along with the means and standard deviations
for these variables by sex of the subject.
As a check of random assignment to groups for the
success or failure manipulated task outcome, a one-way
analysis of variance was conducted on the task outcome
variable (success or failure determined by random
assignment to groups} and the actual (undisclosed) WRAT
math score. There was no effect of group placement by
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actual math achievement as measured by the WRAT,
[(1,61)=1.57,

~

>.05, therefore, random assignment to

groups according to mathematics achievement level is
supported.
Before discussing the findings regarding the
hypotheses tested, it should be noted that the analyses
for hypotheses I through IV were performed across the
sex of the subject (a between-subjects factor), and not
across the success vs. failure dimension of the MAS
items (a within-subjects factor)

(Winer, 1971). Although

other researchers have interpreted the models discussed
earlier in the present paper as not addressing this
issue (Frieze et al., 1982), the literature was
understood by this author as clearly distinguishing
predictions as relatively "high" or "low" across the sex
of the subject (see Table 3). This oversight by Frieze
et al.

(1982) may be related to an exclusion on their

part, the aforementioned lack of specific predictions
for male subjects' attributional patterns.

These

specific predictions have been clearly put forth in much
of the literature in this area (e.g., Forsyth &
Schlenker, 1977; Levine et al., 1982; Sweeney, Moreland

& Gruber, 1982).
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Sex Differences
To test the hypothesis that males' and females'
causal attributions for success and failure task
outcomes shall differ, a 2 (sex of the subject) by 2
(success or failure task outcome) multivariate analysis
of variance was done with sex, and the task outcome to
be discussed below, treated as between-subjects factors.
The expected main effect for sex was statistically
significant, E(8,52)=2.92,

~

<.009.

Univariate F-tests

revealed that females attributed success as due to an
easy task, an external stable cause, more often than
males, E(l,59)=5.78,

~

<.019; whereas males described

themselves as having greater ability, an internal stable
cause, following a success, E(l,59)=3.88,

~

<.05.

Also,

males attributed failure outcomes as due to a difficult
task, an external stable cause, signigicantly more often
than did females, E(l,59)=3.98,

~

<.05 (see Figure 1).

Thus, as expected, there were significant differences
between male's and female's attributional styles, the
pattern of which will be further addressed by hypothesis
IV. Means and standard deviations for male's and
female's scores are presented in Table 4, and Figure 1
presents a graph of the signifcant differences in
scores.
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Table 4
Mean~~tandard

Deviations and Ranges of the MAS

~'!d_bSC§..1~~-for -~al~s

and_:[_~males

Subscale

Mean

STD

Range

Success
----Ability

females
males

11.529*
13.069

3.449
3.555

5-19
7-20

Effort

females
males

12.706
13.552

3. 167
3.601

7-19
6-20

Task

females
males

13.824***
12.379

2.355
2.336

9-18
8-17

Environ

females
males

12.559
12.586

2.956
2.626

7-18
7-19

Ability

females
males

11.559
11.241

3.544
3.651

5-19
5-20

Effort

females
males

13.265
12.621

2.906
2.665

8-18
8-17

Task

females
males

10.294**
12.103

3.589
3.447

4-18
5-17

Environ

females
males

2.249
2.698

4-14
4-14

Failure

*2. < .01
* *2. < .05
***2. < .02

8.176
8.931
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Task Outcome
The second between subjects factor of the MANOVA
refered to above addresses the task outcome; regardless
of sex of the subject, successful task outcomes will
elicit more internal attributions than external
attributions and vice-versa for failure task outcomes.
The expected main effect for task outcome was
statistically significant, [(8,52)=4.05, E < .001.
Univariate F-tests revealed that responses to the
"failure" stems of the MAS did support the hypothesis;
subjects who failed at the math task attributed their
failure to their ability and effort, internal causes,
significantly less than those subjects who succeeded;
for ability E(l,59)=21.00, E < .0001, and for effort
[(1,59)=10.46, E < .002 (Table 5).

The responses to the

"success" stems of the MAS only partially support the
hypothesis; subjects who succeeded attributed their
success as significantly less due to luck than those who
failed, E(l,59)=4.15, E < .046, yet successful subjects
also attributed their success as less due to their
ability, an internal factor, than those who failed,
[(1,59)=12.40, E < .001 (see Figure 2). Means and
standard deviations for the success and failure
conditions are presented in Table 6, while descriptive
statistics for male and female subjects by task outcome
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for Subjects by

Mean

STD

Success-Ability
Success-Effort
Success-Task
Success-Environment

10.875
12.469
12.813
11.875

3.108
3.556
2.494
2.960

Failure-Ability
Failure-Effort
Failure-Task
Failure-Environment

13.188
14.031
11.656
8.531

3.587
2.559
3.534
2.449

Success-Ability
Success-Effort
Success-Task
Success-Environment

13.645
13.742
13.526
13.290

3.479
3.098
2.365
2.438

Failure-Ability
Failure-Effort
Failure-Task
Failure-Environment

9.581
11.871
10.581
8.516

2.487
2.630
3.668
2.541

Condition
Success
-----

Failure
-----
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of the MAS Subscales
for Males and Females by Task Outcome

Success

SuccessAbility
SuccessEffort
SuccessTask
SuccessEnviron
FailureAbility
FailureEffort
FailureTask
FailureEnviron

Failure

females

males
----

females

males

10.529
(3.145)

11.267
(3.127)

12.529
(3.538)

15.000
(2.987)

12.176
(3.187)

12.800
(4.021)

13.235
(3.153)

14.357
(3.028)

13.765
(2.412)

11. 733
(2.187)

13.882
(2.369)

13.071
(2.368)

11. 882
(3.120)

11.867
(2.875)

13.235
(2.705)

13.357
(2.170)

13.235
(3.580)

13.133
(3.720)

9.882
(2.667)

9.214
(2.293)

14.647
(2.827)

13.333
(2.093)

11. 882
(2.315)

11.857
(3.060)

10.588
(3.144)

12.286
(3.661)

10.000
(4.062)

11.286
(3.124)

8.176
(1.980)

8.933
(2.915)

8.176
(2.555)

8.929
(2.556)
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assignment are presented in Table 6.
Interaction Effect
It was expected that sex of the subject and
success or failure task outcome variables would interact
significantly, such that females would score
significantly different from males on the eight MAS
subscales depending on whether the subject has
experienced a success or failure.

The hypothesized two-

way interaction (sex by task outcome) was not
statistically significant,

~(8,52)=.48,

~

<.867, nor

were any of the resultant univariate tests of
significance.

Discussion of this, and other findings,

will be addressed in the next section.
A Test of the Models
In order to assess which of the models,
Externality, Self-Derogatory or Low Expectancy, best
predicts the causal attributions made by males and
females for success and failure experiences, two sets of
three Pearson chi-squared goodness-of-fit tests were
performed (Hayes, 1981).
priori.

All tests were planned a

The chi-squared tests were accomplished by

partitioning each dependent variable, regardless of sex
of the subject, by its median to establish relative
"high" and "low" scores as specified by the models.
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This was done twice, once for the subjects in the
failure experimental condition and again for those in
success condition.

Then a count of the number of males

and females whose score fit into either the high or low
range was made for each causal category.

Each subject's

scores for each category was then coded as a "hit" or a
"miss" for the appropriate manipulation condition; a hit
if a male scored in the high group or if a female scored
in the low group, or a miss if a male scored in the low
group and a female scored in the high group.

The

results of this procedure are presented in Table 7 under
the outcome label.
Six Pearson chi-squared goodness-of-fit tests were
performed comparing the expected pattern, as predicted
by each model, to the outcome pattern.

None of the

three models produced a significantly "good-fit" to the
data: Externality model for success X2(3)=45.50, E >.05,
for failure X2(3)=84.15, E >.05; Self-Derogatory model
for success X2(3)=45.5, E >.05, and for failure
X2{3)=37.14, E >.05, and Low Expectancy for success
X2{3)=76.30, E >.05, and for failure X2(3)=68.16, E >.05
(see Table 7).
The expected outcome pattern for each model was
derived by first considering the predictions made by
each model (see Table 3).

Since the models make
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Table 7
Pearson Chi-Squared Goodness-of-Fit Tests Applied to
the Three Models

Success
---Task Outcome
and MAS scores

Model

Failure
Task Outcome
and MAS scores

Externality

45.50

84.15

Self-Derogatory

45.50

37.14

Low Expectancy

76.30

68.16

Note.

None of the chi-squared values reached
significance at the .05 level.
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relative predictions rather than point predictions,
relative numeric values for the expected outcome cells
in Table 3 were coded with the lowest number possible in
any one cell.

Hayes (1981) states no cell in a Pearson

chi-square goodness-of-fit test can by empty, and
recommends five observations per calls as a minimum to
perform the test.

Therefore, five observations per cell

were expected in the "low" cells, while the remainder of
the observations were expected in the "high" prediction
cells.
Table 8 is presented to illustrate this process.
Each of the three models is presented contrasting the
"predicted" pattern of outcome as predicted by that
model versus the actual "outcome" produced by the data.
The expected pattern for each model was generated by
following the "high" and "low" relative predictions for
each model as presented in Table 3.

Scoring was

accomplished by recording a "hit" or "1" if males were
expected to score higher than females, and a "miss" or
"O" if females were expected to score lower than males.
A tally of expected hits and misses for each task
outcome (success and failure) was made while taking into
account the cell size assumptions of a chi-squared
goodness-of-fit test.

The predicted cells were then

contrasted with the outcome cells described earlier by
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Table 8
Six Pearson Chi-Squared Coodness-of-Fit Tables
Contrasting the Outcome Predicted by each Model
versus the Data Outcome for Success and Failure

Outcome
Success
N=33

Models
Externality
Predicted
Outcome

Ability

Effort

Task

Environment

27
18

27
17

5
10

5
18

Self-Derogatory
Predicted
27
Outcome
18

27
17

5
10

5
18

Low Expectancy
Predicted
Outcome

5
17

27
10

27
18

5
18

Failure
N=31

Models
Externality
Predicted
Outcome

Ability

Effort

Task

Environment

26
15

26
13

5
19

5
18

Self-Derogatory
Predicted
5
Outcome
15

5
13

26
19

26
18

Low Expectancy
Predicted
Outcome

26
13

5
19

26
18

5
15
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performing six Pearson chi-squared goodness-of-fit
tests.
Although no support was obtained for any of the
models using the Pearson chi-squared test, an
examination of the mean scores on the MAS subscales for
males and females reveals some interesting trends (Table
9).

There are significant differences between males'

and females' MAS scores on three of the eight subscales.
The observed difference in the mean attribution scores
for success to an ability cause is congruent with all
three models.

Men tend to attribute success to ability

more than do women.

Women tend to attribute success to

an easy task more so than do men.

This finding supports

the Externality and Self-Derogatory models, but not the
Low Expectancy model.

And women tend to attribute

failure to a difficult task less often than do men, thus
supporting only the prediction made by the SelfDerogatory model.
An examination of the statistically different mean
MAS scores for males and females reveals a pattern of
differences in the MAS scores for the subscales SuccessEffort, Failure-Ability, Failure-Effort, and FailureEnvironment which mimics the pattern proposed by the
Self-Derogatory model.

The Success-Environment MAS

subscale produced mean values which were approximately
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Table 9
Means, Directional Trends as Compared to the Opposite
Sex 1 and Significance Levels of the Mean Differences
between Males and Females of the MAS Subscales for
Males and Females

__

Females
Mean
Directional
Trend
Males
Mean
Directional
Trend
Significance
Level of the
Mean Differences

Tasl:S__Q.Y.:t.£9..~-

Ability

Success
Effort

Task

Luck

11.529

12.706

13.824

12.559

Low

Low

High

13.069

13.552

High

High

Low

p=.325

p=.018

p=.051

12.379

Low
12.586

High

p=.969

-------------------------------------------------------(continued)
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Table 9 (continued)
Means 1 Directional Trends as Com2ared to the Opposite
Sex, and Significance Levels of the Mean Differences
between Males and Females of the MAS Subscales for
Males and Females

Ability
Females
Mean
Directional
Trend
Males
Mean
Directional
Trend
Significance
Level of the
Mean Differences

Task Outcome
Failure
Effort
Task

10.294

Luck

11.559

13.265

High

High

11.241

12.621

12.103

Low

Low

High

High

p=.728

p=.366

p=.047

p=.231

Low

8.177

Low
8.931
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equal in value and in the opposite direction to that
predicted by the Self-Derogatory model.

The Success-

Environment MAS subscale produced mean values which were
approximately equal in value and in the opposite
direction to that predicted by the Self-Derogatory model
(see Tables 3, 8 and 9).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings of the present study support some of
the past research in the area of applying ATAM to sex
differences and shall be reviewed briefly.

First, males

and females attribute causality for success and failure
task outcomes to causal categories in a significantly
different manner.

These patterns of attributions can

best be predicted by the Self-Derogatory model.

The

Self-Derogatory model claims that females attribute
causality for success to external causes and for failure
to internal causes, while males attribute in a selfenhancing manner by attributing success to internal
causes and failure to external causes.

Also, the

present study confirmed predicted attributional
differences used by persons who experience success
versus failure.

Subjects who succeeded at the math task

attributed their success to internal factors more than
external ones, while those who failed attributed their
failure to external factors more than to internal ones.
The purpose of this study was to apply ATAM in an
investigation of a specific cognitive ability,
mathematics, in which fairly consistent sex differences
are found (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).

The sex-

stereotyped nature of mathematics prohibits
66
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generalization of the findings to other tasks as males'
and female's causal attributions differ depending on the
nature of the task (McHugh et al., 1982, cited in Frieze
et al., 1982; Wolleat et al., 1980).
The findings of the present study also may be only
applicable to college aged students.

Continued research

in this area contrasting the Externality, SelfDerogatory and Low Expectancy models using various
subject groups of differing ages, education and other
backround variables would address the generalizability
of the present findings.

Yet, the findings can and

should be discussed in terms of mathematics achievement
which has impact on career choice and attainment (Frieze
et al., 1978a; Parsons et al., 1982).
Discussion of the Major Findings
The existence of sex differences in the use of
causal attributional categories for success and failure
experiences is supported by the present study.

An

overall main effect for the sex of the subject was
highly significant.

Females' and males' use of causal

attributional categories were significantly different
from one another.

Significant univariate effects were

achieved for only three of the eight MAS subscales by
sex, and none of the three models produced a
significantly good-fit to the data as measured by

68
Pearson chi-squared goodness-of-fit tests, yet the three
significant univariate F-tests do differentiate the
models to some extent.

All three models predict the

significant difference found on the Success-Ability MAS
subscale; men tend to attribute success to their own
ability, an internal stable cause, more than do women.
The next significant MAS subscale difference to be
discussed supports the Externality and Self-Derogatory
models, but not the Low Expectancy model (see Table 3).
Women tend to attribute success to an easy task while
men minimize this cause in their explanation of a
success experience.

Thirdly, women tend to attribute

failure to a difficult task less often than do men, a
finding which is predicted by the Self-Derogatory model
alone.

Thus, only one model, the Self-Derogatory model,

accurately predicted the significant sex differences in
causal attributions for success and failure at a math
task.
Further information may be gleaned by examining
the statistically nonsignificant differences in males'
and females' MAS subscale scores.

The directional

trends in males' and females' mean MAS scores (see Table
8) highlights additional information.

ATAM theorists

and researchers have emphasized that subjects use a
variety of causal categories for any one event, so
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predominance of category use is of primary importance
(Feather, 1969; Weiner, 1985).

Therefore, examining

trends in the use of causal categories seems to be a
salient modus operandi from a theoretical point of view.
Trends in the sex differences in mean scores for
the Success-Effort, Failure-Ability, Failure-Effort, and
Failure-Luck accurately reproduce the relative "high"
and "low" score predictions made by the Self-Derogatory
model.

Only the Success-Luck subscale mean difference

between males and females contradicts the SelfDerogatory model.

The Externality and Low Expectancy

models, on the other hand, are contradicted by trends in
five of the eight subscale scores.

In light of the

preceding discussion, it appears that the SelfDerogatory model has the most, although not
overwhelming, support and generates the most predictive
power when applied to sex differences in attributions
for achievement in mathematics.

The Self-Derogatory

model anticipates females will not take credit for a
success by making internal attributions for that event,
but instead attribute success to external factors such
as an easy task, luck, or some other favorable
evnvironmental factor.

Yet, females blame their lack of

ability and low amount of effort as causing failure
experiences, while ignoring external factors that may
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have contributed to their poor performance.

Thus,

females tend to perpetuate low levels of self-esteem for
success at a math task.
According to the Self-Derogatory model, men
attribute causality for success and failure in a selfenhancing or egotistical way.

Males maintain a high

degree of self-esteem in task specific areas or selfeff icacy (Bandura, 1977), by attributing success to
internal factors and failure to external factors.
Therefore, men incorporate favorable information and
ascribe it to themselves and disregard negative
information as inapplicable to oneself.
Implications of a self-derogatory attributional
style for females and a self-enhancing bias for males
are several.

First, empirical evidence shows internal

attributions for failure result in decreased motivation
and decrements in actual task performance (Ickes &
Layden, 1978).

Women may experience failure at

mathematics with increasing frequency as their
attributions for one such failure experience affects
motivation and actual performance, thus adding to the
self-perpetuating cycle of negative self-regard
discussed as a result of the attributional pattern
itself (Heilman & Kram, 1978).
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Secondly, women's affective experience, including
their self-esteem for the task specific behaviors, are
generally negative.

According to Weiner (1985) an

attribution for success to external factors results in
surprise and gratitude, whereas success attributed to
internal causes results in feelings of competence.
Also, attributions for failure to external causes result
in anger or aggression, whereas attributions for failure
to internal causes result in shame, guilt and
incompetence.

Therefore, women will tend to experience

negative affective experiences for failure and few selfreferent and/or positive affects for success.

Men, on

the other hand, will experience positive feelings such
as competence after a success and direct any negative
feelings following failure towards external sources.
The hypothesis that the manipulated task outcome,
regardless of sex of the subject, would have a
significant effect on attributional statements lying
along the internality-externality dimension was
supported.

It was predicted that subjects who succeed

tend to take personal responsibility for the outcome by
attributing their success to internal causes such as
ability and effort.

Subjects who fail tend to shun

personal responsibility for the outcome by attributing
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their failures to external causes such as bad luck and a
difficult task.
Three of the eight MAS subscale mean scores by sex
resulted in significant differences as predicted by
hypothesis II.

Subjects who failed at the math task

attributed the outcome significantly less often to
ability and effort, both internal causes, than those
subjects who succeeded.

Also, subjects who succeeded

considered luck, an external cause, a less important
cause of the outcome than those who failed.
Yet, contradictory to the predictions made in
hypothesis II, successful subjects also attributed
causality to an ability factor, an internal cause, less
than those who failed.

While this finding may be

initially somewhat surprising, it may be that female's

attributions to ability for a success event are
infrequent, as predicted by all three models addressed
by hypothesis IV, and confirmed by empirical evidence
(Frieze et al., 1982).

Therefore, the females'

attributions for the Success-Ability score are low
enough to deflate the effect of higher scores from the
male subjects.

The hypothesis remains unconfirmed for

this causal category, yet the effect of strong sex
differences on the Success-Ability score may be a
contributing factor which overrides attributional
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differences predicted by the task outcome.
The lack of support for an interaction between the
sex of the subject and the manipulated task outcome is
puzzling and difficult to explain.

Perhaps this

indicates sex of the subject and the task outcome must
be considered jointly in future research and in
evaluating past research in this area.

Each main effect

examined in the study significantly affects causal
attributions for success or failure at a math task.
However, the differences are embedded in variations
along each effect such that sex differences must be
discussed separately for success or failure at math
tasks.
In sum, ATAM and the Self-Derogatory model
interpretation of the theroy appears to be one area of
investigation which may aid in explaining the observed
differences in male's and female's mathematical ability
as a learned difference.

ATAM and the Self-Derogatory

model gained some empirical support from the present
study which is one of few studies in the area of sex
differences in attributions of causality for success and
failure which focused on a meaningful as well as sextyped task.
Further Issues for Consideration
In addition to considering the factors discussed
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above in interpreting the present study's results,
several additional factors need to be considered.

Past

research has found that ability and effort are the most
salient attributional categories among the six that the
revised ATAM has proposed (Frieze, 1976; Weiner, 1979).
Therefore, it may be problematic in verifying a model
using all four causal categories.

The causal categories

task and luck will likely be used less often and may not
be directly comparable to attributions to ability and
effort.

Attributions for failure to task and

luck/environment appear to be somewhat less frequently
endorsed (see Table 4).

The effect of this discrepancy

on experimental findings should be evaluated in future
research.
Secondly, linked to the aforementioned factor, the
Failure-Task, Success-Task, Failure-Environment, and
Success-Environment subscales of the MAS have relatively
low reliability coefficients (Fennema et al., 1979).
These subscales may not be accurately tapping the
intended causal category and produce nonsignif icant
results where there actually are differences.

Future

research in this area may advance more quickly with the
development and use of consistent and reliable measures
of attributional causality.
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The lack of support for any of the three models in
a recent meta-analysis (Frieze et al., 1982) may be
dependent on several factors.

Although meta-analysis

has proven to be a useful technique for summarizing an
area of research (Glass, 1977), the scope of its
applicability from which conclusions can be drawn

is

determined by the scope of the studies it uses to obtain
effect sizes and the basis for inclusion or exclusion of
a study from the meta-analysis.

Two such issues must be

raised in regard to Frieze et al. 's (1982) findings and
the present study.

First, Frieze et al.

(1982) included

studies from the attributional research literature which
utilized a wide variety of achievement tasks in a wide
variety of areas.

Some of these tasks appear very

trivial (color matching, Phares, 1957), while others are
much more salient to the subject (an examination grade,
Simon & Feather, 1973; Sweeny et al., 1982).
The disparity among the tasks for which
achievement motivation has been assessed limits the
generalizability of any one of the studies to other task
areas.

Likewise, the applicability of Frieze et al. 's

(1982) meta-analysis is potentially severely confounded.
Perhaps their application of meta-analysis to this area
of research was premature; more research needs to be
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done focusing on specific task-types, as well as making
more comphrensive predictions across all causal
dimensions for studies in this area.
Secondly, Frieze et al.

(1982) chose to exclude

studies in this area which used children as subjects,
although empirical evidence has demonstrated that
"different attributional patterns for explaining male
and female performance appear well established by seveneight years of age and remain strikingly stable through
development"

(Bond & Deming, 1982, p. 1205).

By

including the many studies in this area that use
children as subjects, Frieze et al.

(1982) may have

reached a very different conclusion.
Thus, ATAM and the Self-Derogatory model appear to
possess some explanatory power for sex differences in
mathematics achievement.

However, it appears to be

necessary to conduct future research in sex differences
in mathematics achievement and other areas of
achievement by studying multiple psychological factors
that correlate with gender (Levine et al.,

1982) on

distal as well as proximal levels (Bandura, 1977), to
arrive at a more complete understanding of the sources
and the environmental-societal causes of sex differences
in mathematics achievement.

77

It is recommended that future research efforts
continue to investigate sex differences in mathematics
achievement by applying ATAM and the Self-Derogatory
model in conjunction with efforts to tap other causal
sources of the sex difference.

Some of these include

situational variables such as sex of a pairmate at a
task (Heilman & Kram, 1978; Synder et al., 1978);
cooperative versus competetive tasks (McHugh et al.,
1982); other sex-typed tasks (Wolleat et al., 1980); and
individual variables such as subjective perceptions of
success and failure (Sweeney et al., 1982), sex-role
identity (Williams, 1983),

math anxiety (Plake &

Parker, 1982), value of success at a task (Atkinson,
1964) and many others.
Finally, it is suggested that future research in
this area discontinue viewing women and men (or any
other group) as

homogenous because many variables

determine any one person's actions in any given
situation (Bandura, 1977).

Only when more complex

research projects are undertaken utilizing sophisticated
methodological and statistical techniques soundly, and
considering multiple causal sources, will solutions to
puzzles such as the one addressed in this study be
solved.
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MATHEMATICS ATTRIBUTION SCALE
Imagine that the events described below occured. You
must rate each of the four causes listed under each
event in terms of its likelihood.
Event A: A section of your math test was wrong.
Causes
1. You just couldn't remember how do to the
steps.
2. You were careless about completing it.
3. The part marked wrong included a step
which was more difficult.
4. You were unlucky.
~--~

Be sure to rate all four possible causes of each event
according to how you feel it applies to you.
Do you
STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, are you UNDECIDED, do you
DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with number 1 of Event A?
Mark your answer in the appropriate column on your
answer sheet.
Then do the same with cause number 2, 3
and 4 for Event A.
Now move on to Event B and do the
same.
Even though some of the events may seem
repetative, be sure to answer each cause for each event.
Event B: You got the grade you wanted on the math
test.
5. The content of the test was easy.
6. In the past you spent a lot of time
studying math.
7. Your past math teachers have been good at
explaining math.
8. You have a special talent for math.
Event C: You had trouble with some of the problems.
9. The testing room was too loud and distracted you.
10.You don't think in the logical way that
math requires.
11.You didn't take the time to answer the
questions carefully.
12.They were difficult problems.
Event D: You did not perform as well as the rest
of the group on the math test.
13. Students sitting around you didn't pay
attention and distracted you.
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14. You didn't spend much time working on
the test.
15. The material is difficult.
16. You have always had a difficult time in
math.
Event E: You were able to complete a math test
easily.
17. The problems were interesting.
18. The effort you put into the test helped.
19. You are a very able math student.
20. You lucked into taking an easy version of
the test.
Event F: You were able to understand a difficult
unit on a math test.
21. Your past math teachers presented the
material well.
22. Your ability is more obvious when you
are challenged.
23. You put extra hours of study time into
learning those types of problems.
24. The problems were easy.
Event G: You received a low grade on a math test.
25. You are not the best student in math.
.
26. You have studied those types of problems,
but not hard enough.
27. There were questions you have never seen
before.
28. Past math teachers of yours spent too
little time on this type of problem.
Event H: You have passed most math tests with no
trouble.
29. Past teachers made learning math interesting.
30. You are talented in math.
31. You spent hours of extra time studying
math.
32. The test covered simple problems.
Event I: There are times when you just can't solve
certain types of math problems.
33. It is a task which doesn't interest you.
34. Even though you try, you don't understand
it well.
35. Other class members disturbed your concentration.
36. You don't spend enough time studying them.
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MAS Answer Sheet
Strongly
~a~eo
-

Event A: Cause 1.
II

2.

II

3.

II

4.

-

Agree

.. -

II

Undecided

I
I

I
I

I
I
I

I
I
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Disaa.::-eo

I
I
I

I
I

.: .1 ---T---+----+--~·L!_

II

: . I1

II

I
__i

j.

:~11~~-;--~,-~~~~_.:_i~_____J

II

II

II

"

-=··=--. --·-

-.

II

- -:

"

...

"

...' =
-

II

II

"

II

"

Event G:

~.

.

- ::.
,-

.. - .

I

I

I

I

!

I

I

I

I
I

I

2:.

I

.,.,

I

I

~

.l.

=.

--·

II

23.

II

24.

11

25.

"

26.

II

27.

II

28.

I

I
I

I

I

I

~

l

!

I

i

I

I

I

i

I

I

I

I
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MAS Answer Sheet- pg. 2

. Strongly
Aoree

"

1
3~.,

"

3_. - ·

"

32.

Agree

Undecided

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Event H: Cause 29.

II

II

~-

I

I

------~-_;.__ ___,!

I

I

r------------------------_;._-----,.I

3~._1

__________________________________________

~
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MAS SCORING MANUAL
Instructions: Fill out the following charts for each
subject, total across rows, then total each subscale
(i.e., Success-Ability, Failure-Task) to get eight
subscale scores for each subject.

1

Success-Ability
statement 8.
statement 19.
statement 22.
statement 30.
Success-Effort
statement 6.
statement 18.
statement 23.
statement 31.
Success-Task
statement 5.
statement 17.
statement 24.
statement 32.
Success-Environment
statement 7.
statement 20.
statement 21.
statement 29.
F ailure-Ability

statement
statement
statement
statement

10.
16.
25.
34.

F ailure-Effort

statement
statement
statement
statement

11.
14.
26.
36.

2

3

4

5

raw
total

subscale
score
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1

Failure-Task
statement 12.
statement 15.
statement 27.
statement 33.
Failure-Environment
statement 9.
statement 13.
statement 28.
statement 35.

2

3

4

5

raw
total

subs ca le
score
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